Prem Darshan Sapkota and Srishti Adhikari
The 2026 General Election in Nepal represents a definitive transition in the nation’s two-decade political history, serving as a structural reset following the Gen Z movement of September 2025. It marks a turning in the country’s politics: the Nepali electorate has given a clear mandate to a single party for only the second time in the last three decades. The results show that the Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) has won an impressive 182 seats in the parliament, just two seats shy of a two-third majority. The 2026 election, the third conducted under the 2015 Constitution, occurred in a climate of intense public suspicion. Held in the aftermath of the September 2025 Gen Z protests, that saw the killings of 76 civilians, destruction of government offices, and the residences of the established political class, effectively ousted the then Nepali Congress and the Communist Party of Nepal- Unified Marxist-Leninist- CPN(UML) coalition government led by KP Sharma Oli and the dissolution of parliament, the elections represented the only democratic way out of the political vacuum. The result of an outright majority for RSP is a rare occurrence in Nepal’s fractious political landscape, particularly since the introduction of the mixed system, which many believed would make an outright majority impossible. It is also a clear expression of public frustration with corruption, instability and political elites.
The run up to the elections was fraught with doubts about the government’s capacity to hold the elections within six months, initial pursuits by the established parties, particularly the CPN(UML) for the reinstatement of the parliament and the steady circulation of conspiracy theories about what happened in the Gen Z protests in September 2025. The fact that the elections were held within the stipulated time and with significantly less violence than previous cycles signal a newfound electoral maturity both in terms of management and public participation. Furthermore, the show of support from the established parties to the government and the Election Commission in holding the elections despite their constant villainization in the media underscores their democratic political culture despite their faults and numerous shortcomings.
From our election observation and exit polls in various sections, we found an interesting feature of this election: the Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) received its bulk of support from the working class, the youth and the elderly (aged 60 and above). This diverse coalition suggests that the desire for a “reset” was not limited to a single generation but was a nationwide consensus. Additionally, in continuance of the trend we witnessed in a select few urban areas in the last election, this time around most women across the country voted independently of their familial allegiance, choosing differently than their male counterparts. This trend of independent female voting is a significant milestone in Nepal’s democratic journey, signaling that women are increasingly making political choices based on their own assessments of governance and leadership rather than following traditional family or community directions. Although this election has been mainly associated with the hopes and demands from the youth, it is imperative that we view the rise of the RSP, not merely as an expression of youth backing but also as an intergenerational choice for change.
The 2026 results have also settled a long-standing debate regarding the feasibility of the existing electoral system. For years, critics argued that the mixed system—combining First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) and Proportional Representation (PR)—would perpetually lead to fragmented “hung” parliament and unstable coalitions. However, this election proved that even within this complex framework, a single political party can secure a clear majority if they capture the public’s imagination. By achieving this, the new leadership has a mandate to govern without the constant threat of being toppled by smaller coalition partners. It is also important to note that this majority was achieved while upholding the constitutional mandate for inclusion, including the 33% requirement for women’s representation and the mandatory inclusion of minorities and Dalits. The new parliament proves that stability and inclusion are not mutually exclusive but rather twin pillars of our modern, representative democracy.
First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) System: Seat Share
The FPTP system consists of 165 seats. The following table shows the number of seats won and the corresponding percentage of total FPTP seats for the major parties.
Political Party | Seats Won (FPTP) | Percentage of FPTP Seats |
Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) | 125 | 75.76% |
Nepali Congress (NC) | 18 | 10.91% |
CPN (UML) | 9 | 5.45% |
Nepali Communist Party | 8 | 4.85% |
Shram Sanskriti Party | 3 | 1.82% |
Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP) | 1 | 0.61% |
Others / Independents | 1 | 0.61% |
Total | 165 | 100% |
Proportional Representation (PR) System: Vote Share
This table reflects the distribution of the 10,835,025 valid votes processed. Parties failing to meet the 3% national threshold have been merged in “Others” category.
Political Party | Total PR Votes | Percentage of PR Votes |
Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) | 5,183,493 | 47.84% |
Nepali Congress (NC) | 1,759,172 | 16.24% |
CPN (UML) | 1,455,885 | 13.44% |
Nepali Communist Party | 811,577 | 7.49% |
Shram Sanskriti Party | 385,902 | 3.56% |
Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP) | 330,684 | 3.05% |
Others (Below 3% Threshold) | 908,312 | 8.38% |
Total | 10,835,025 | 100.00% |
The most striking feature of this election was the rejection of traditional ideological “isms”. For the first time, voters moved past the decades-long debates between socialism, monarchism, and liberalism, treating political parties not as sources of political identities but as service providers that were chosen for 35 years in various permutations and combinations and yet failed to deliver. This shift was reflected in the 2025 Purak Asia Survey, which in hindsight can be seen as a statistical harbinger of the results. The survey revealed that 77.5% of citizens had already detached themselves from party affiliations. When the ballots were counted, this detachment was evident in the collapse of the old guard: the Leftist bloc lost a staggering 20% of its vote share as their traditional “vote banks” evaporated. The Monarchist forces saw their support halved, proving that while the public was angry with the current republic, they were not interested in returning to a romanticized autocratic past. Even the Nepali Congress, the traditional centrist anchor, lost 10% of its base. Most telling was the decline of regional and identity-based parties, which lost nearly half their support as the electorate pivoted toward a “New vs. Old” binary that transcended ethnic and geographic boundaries.
This electoral innovation was driven by the “Balen Factor” and the rise of the RSP. Balen Shah, ethnically from the Madheshi community, bridged a historic divide by resonating deeply with both the plains and the hills. His success, alongside Harka Sampang’s resonance in the eastern hills, centered on the perception of “clean” leadership. Balen Shah, lauded as a populist by many, is a dissenter. As the mayor of Kathmandu Metropolitan City, he challenged the interference from the federal government on rights and responsibilities of the local government. In doing so, he confronted the old parties’ reluctance to fully adopt the demarcations of the rights and responsibilities of the federal system and stood up for the rights of the local government granted by the constitution. This breaking away from traditional ways of doing things and the courage of being the lone voice against the authority of political parties resonated with people across the country.
The 2025 Purak Asia survey data highlighted that 93.3% of the public believed the old parties were complicit in systemic corruption, and this was also reflected in the demand for anti-corruption and accountability from the youth during the Gen-Z protests. Considering this, RSP’s anti-corruption platform seemed like an answer to their prayers for the voters. The public explicitly sought “young blood,” with 91.8% of survey respondents calling for a generational handover. The voters treated this election as a means to replace stagnant political monopoly and this is evident in the results. There is a significant youth representation from the direct elections in the new parliament—54 of the directly elected candidates are under the age of 40.
The result was a historic majority for new political forces, a mandate that provides a rare opportunity for institutional reinvention but also carries the weight of immense public expectation. For the policy community, this shift presents a unique window of opportunity to redefine the relationship between the state and its citizens. As many professional and young parliamentarians enter the new parliament, there is a distinct opportunity for policy analysts from the civic front to engage with a more receptive legislative body. There is now a space to push for deep-seated bureaucratic reforms and the digitalization of governance that the previous “syndicate” of parties had resisted. There is an opportunity for some civic organizations to act as the intellectual architect in helping a party of newcomers translate their “anti-corruption” energy into sustainable policy frameworks. Furthermore, the high level of interest and engagement from the diaspora and social media users allows civic organizations to bypass traditional gatekeepers and mobilize public opinion for transparency.
The primary policy challenge for the new government lies in the lack of a tested legislative track record. There is a tangible danger of a policy vacuum, since the party campaigned on a platform of “newness” rather than concrete agendas; their stance on complex issues like federalism, foreign policy, and debt management remains undefined. Furthermore, constitutional amendments are on the table, given the near two-third majority for RSP. However, RSP needs to realize that the constitution is a product of intense socio-political negotiations, and any proposed amendments will need to be carried out with due process and consultations with the public. Civil society, therefore, has a vital role in filling this void by providing both technical expertise and a critical perspective. Since the opposition within the parliament is weak in terms of numbers, civil society also has the additional task of remaining vigilant and raising voices of different sections to ensure that this overwhelming majority is used to strengthen democratic processes and institutions, rather than becoming a tool for overreaching power.
While the euphoria and hope are palpable at this moment, the challenges are equally formidable. The RSP has secured a massive mandate, yet its commitment to democratic principles remains largely untested in a parliamentary setting. Most of its elected representatives are newcomers without established ideological positions, raising questions about party cohesion. There is a genuine concern in some quarters that this majority, fueled by frustration rather than clear policy, could move in unpredictable directions. Furthermore, the rising rhetoric against the right to freedom of association—specifically frustrations aired regarding trade and student unions—suggests a potential friction with established civic organizations. If the new government views all intermediary institutions as “remnants of the old system,” the space for independent civic oversight may shrink.
Addressing these risks will require civil society to adopt the role of a watchdog. Nepali civil society will need to monitor the activities of the government, particularly in relation to the protection of the marginalized voices. While Balen Shah is a symbol of hope for many, his previous use of force against street vendors and the landless in Kathmandu suggests a governance style that may prioritize urban aesthetics over human rights and equity. Given the near two-third majority, civil society will also have to track parliamentary functioning and legislative transparency, ensuring that the majority does not lead to fast-tracking laws that bypass public consultation or weaken the right to association. It is also important that the civil society hold RSP accountable on their anti-corruption measures. Most importantly, we need to ensure that the quest for justice does not devolve into populist revenge against old political cadres, which would jeopardize long-term stability.
The ultimate stability of this new era depends on whether the RSP and its leaders can move beyond being a “reaction” to the old parties and become a proactive force for institutional stability. For civil society, the task ahead is to be both a collaborator and a critic. They must support the mandate for change while defending the pluralism that makes democracy possible. The 2026 election proved that the Nepali people want a government that is not just new, but just. It falls to both government and civil society to translate the street’s voice into the language of law, without sacrificing the democratic process as well as rights of freedom of association and expressions.
